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Abstract
Our paper assesses the impacts of the 1996 US Farm Bill on production decisions. We apply the 
expected utility model to analyze farmers’ behavior under risk and assess how farmers’ 
production decisions change in the presence of government programs. Specifically, we 
empirically evaluate the relative price and the risk-related effects of farm policy changes at the 
intensive margin of production, as well as the extra value that these policies add to farmers’ 
certainty equivalent . We use farm-level data collected in Kansas to estimate the model. We find 
evidence that decoupled government programs have only negligible impacts on production 
decisions.
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Introduction
Researchers have widely used the expected utility model in order to shed light on 
individuals’ behavior under risk. This approach has been widely criticized in previous 
research. Buschena (2003) argued that the expected utility theory’s axiomatic framework
has been repeatedly violated in experimental settings. Rabin (2000) showed that 
attributing all risk behavior to diminishing marginal utility of wealth in small gambles 
can lead to unlikely levels of risk aversion.1 As Bardsley and Harris (1987) noted, 
estimates of risk attitudes based on experiments are artificial and may offer poor
guidance regarding behavior in real economic environments (see Wik et al., 2004 for an 
example of measurement of risk aversion from experimental data). Following this
argument, Bar-Shira et al. (1997) and  Roberts et al. (2004) pointed out that, though it is 
unclear that individuals have the ability to connect their beliefs to the rational concept of 
probability, it is possible that they actually behave according to expected utility theory 
outside an experimental framework.
The reason why the expected utility model may be a good approach to assess 
individual firms’ behavior is that firms are often evaluated on the basis of their short-run 
profits. Shareholders may be unsure about the manager’s ability, who in turn may be 
willing to give up some short-run profits in order to reduce longer-term losses. It is also
true that many applied analyses based on the expected utility framework have obtained 
very reasonable results. Examples of these studies include Bar-Shira et al. (1997) and Isik 
and Khanna (2003). Additionally, one should note that the expected utility framework is
1 Just and Peterson (2003) suggested that this criticism could be extended to more realistic risky situations.
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useful in that it allows determination of the welfare costs of a firm’s profit risk through 
the computation of the certainty equivalent (CE) of farm profits (Morduch, 1995).
Farming, like other entrepreneurial activities, is subject to many financial risks.
Concerns about farm risks and farmers’ abilities to manage these risks have led to a 
variety of government agricultural support programs in developed countries. As Roberts 
et al. (2004) explained, these programs are very relevant to US agriculture: direct 
payments from the Federal Government to farmers were around $22 billion annually in
the period 1999-2001, while total crop sales receipts for this same period were about $92-
$93 billion per year, suggesting that direct payments tended to be about 24% of total crop 
sales in each of the three years.  Direct, decoupled payments, counter-cyclical payments,
and price supports averaged about 75% of total direct payment outlays between 1990-
2005, suggesting that most payments were made to major field crop producers. Roberts 
and Key (2003) noted that, in 2001, the year of the largest government outlays under the 
Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act, of the $23 billion in total farm 
program payments, direct decoupled payments accounted for about $5 billion, marketing
loan (price support) payments accounted for about $8 billion, and emergency assistance
was about $8 billion. Given the magnitude of these payments, they may strongly
influence agricultural production decisions, even in cases where payments are not directly 
tied to production.
In recent years, there have been important agricultural policy reforms worldwide 
that have often involved a change in the way farm incomes are supported (Gardner, 1992;
Hennessy, 1998; Rude, 2001). Until recently, support was mainly provided through
policies explicitly linked to production decisions (i.e., coupled policies).  However, recent 
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policy changes have attempted to break this link through a process known as
“decoupling.” Decoupling aims to support farm incomes while reducing efficiency losses 
related to coupled policies such as price-support measures or deficiency payments
(Chambers, 1995). Our empirical study focuses on US agricultural policy reforms
introduced by the 1996 Farm Bill.
The literature that assesses production impacts of policy instruments has shown 
that, in the context of a deterministic world with complete (credit) markets, or under the 
assumption that agents are risk neutral, only those policies that distort relative market
prices have an impact on producers’ decisions. In addition, an extensive literature shows 
that in a world with uncertainty, decoupled transfers, by means of altering total farm
household wealth, can have an effect on economic agents’ risk attitudes and thus on their 
production decisions (see, Sandmo, 1971; Hennessy, 1998; or Young and Westcott,
2000).
Under the assumption that farmers are characterized by decreasing absolute risk 
aversion preferences,2 lump sum payments may potentially reduce farmers’ absolute risk
aversion, but likely not their relative risk aversion. Hennessy (1998) has shown that the
willingness to assume more risk may result in an increase in production. These “second-
order” effects are known as the wealth effects of policy. While a change in price supports 
is likely to exert a significant impact on production, it is less clear that producers will 
strongly react to decoupled government transfers. Second-order effects might be expected 
2 A number of previous studies that have tested for economic agents’ risk preferences have provided 
evidence in favor of decreasing absolute risk aversion (see, for example, Isik and Khanna, 2003; Saha,
1997; or Bar-Shira et al. 1997).
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to be small relative to the effects of coupled policies. The existence of these effects and 
their magnitude are issues requiring empirical analysis.
The objective of this paper is to assess whether the 1996 US Farm Bill, aimed at
decoupling government program payments from production decisions, succeeded in its 
objective. We apply the expected utility model to analyze farmers’ behavior under risk 
and to determine the extent to which this framework leads to reasonable results when 
implemented in realistic, risky situations. Specifically, we evaluate the relative price and 
the risk-related effects of farm policy changes at the intensive margin of production, as 
well as the extra value that these policies add to farmers’ certainty equivalent (CE). A 
large body of literature exists on the impacts of risk preferences and uncertainties on 
economic agents’ decisions (see, for example, Just and Zilberman, 1986; Chavas and 
Holt, 1990; Pope, 1982; Pope and Just, 1991; Leathers and Quiggin, 1991; Just and Pope,
2002; or Kumbhakar, 2002). Most of these studies, however, have imposed restrictive 
assumptions on producers’ risk preferences (see Love and Buccola, 1991). Isik and 
Khanna (2003), whose approach we follow in this analysis, use a functional form based
on Saha’s (1997) work that adds flexibility to previously used forms.
Though several published empirical studies have assessed the effects of (partially) 
decoupled policies, most of these analyses have assumed risk neutrality (see, for
example, Moro and Sckokai, 1999; Guyomard et al., 1996; Adams et al., 2001). As a
result, they have ignored the potential risk effects of policy. A few studies have 
considered risk and risk preferences (Ridier and Jacket, 2002; Serra et al., 2006)3 but
3 Goodwin and Mishra (2006) estimate a model which is only indirectly related to the expected utility
conceptual model and do not derive risk preference parameters.
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have not distinguished between the relative price and risk-related effects of policy, nor 
assessed the influence of policy on farmers’ CE.4 We extend this literature by providing 
an empirical investigation of the effects of decoupling that explicitly considers producers’
risks and risk attitudes, that identifies the risk-related effects of policy, and that analyzes
how the CE changes when farm programs are modified.
The article is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the methods
employed in our analysis. In the empirical application section, we offer specifics on the 
data and the definition of the model variables. We then present estimation results derived
from the analysis of farm-level data obtained from a sample of Kansas farms. Concluding
remarks are offered in the last section.
Methods
Our model of production under uncertainty follows Meyer (1987) in that we 
assume that farmers rank alternative choices using a utility function that is defined on the 
first two moments of the random payoff. Farmers’ risk attitudes are represented using
Saha’s (1997) nonlinear mean-standard deviation utility function. The same approach
was recently used by Isik and Khanna (2003) to assess the value of site-specific 
technologies.
4 Sckokai and Moro (2006) is an exception. They assess the risk-related impacts of the partially decoupled
payments of the 1992 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform by using a dual approach of the EU
model. As noted by an anonymous referee, with the use of duality, the ability to reflect risk issues
adequately is highly questionable. Antón and Le Mouël (2004), on the other hand, compare the risk-
reducing incentives to produce created by US loan defficiency and counter-cyclical payments.
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Agricultural policy in developed countries usually involves the use of price-
support measures (such as US deficiency payments) that keep market prices artificially 
high. We compare production impacts of lump sum payments with the effects of price
supports, which represent a coupled element of support. A decoupled payment is defined 
as an income-support payment that is exogenously fixed and that does not depend on 
actual, current production or prices.
The effects of government cash transfers on land values has been widely 
considered in the literature (see, for example, Barnard et al., 1997; Goodwin and Ortalo-
Magné, 1992; Weersink et al., 1999; Just and Miranowski, 1993; Schertz and Johnston,
1998) and there seems to be a general agreement that economic rents from policy are
likely to influence land prices, which in turn are likely to cause changes in relative input
prices. By considering government transfers as fully decoupled, our model does not 
capture these changes which certainly constitute an interesting avenue for future research.
Suppose a single-output firm produces output using a technology that can be
represented by , where 
y
( )y f x u  x  is the quantity utilized of a variable input, and u
is a random error term with zero mean and variance 2uV . The mean and variance of output
can be expressed as ( )y f x and 2y 2uV V , respectively.  Farmers are assumed to 
maximize the expected utility of wealth. A farm’s total wealth is represented by 
, where  Z   W pf x wx G Z  is a farm’s initial wealth, p  is the market output 
price which is assumed to be a random variable that is independently distributed from the 
production disturbance, with mean p  and variance 2V p ,  is the variable input price,  and 
 are decoupled government payments. The producer’s optimization problem is 
w
G
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max ( , )W
x
U W V , (1)
where W , the farmer’s expected wealth, is  Z   W pf x wx G , and VW , the standard
deviation of wealth, is  1/ 22 2 2 2 2 2( )V V V V V  W y p y pp f x .
We analyze production decisions at the intensive margin by assuming an internal 
solution,  which allows to express optimal input application as0!x
WW R
x x
Vww  
w w
, (2)
where  ww  
w w
f xW p w
x x
 represents an input’s expected marginal income,
   
2
pW
W
f x
f x
x x
VV
V
ww
 
w w
measures the impact of a change in input use on the standard 
deviation of wealth, and 
W
uR
WV
uw w 
w w
 is the marginal utility ratio of the utility 
function representing a farmer’s risk attitudes. Risk averse (neutral) [seeking] attitudes
involve . The expression ( )[ ]0R !   WR
x
Vw
w
 is known as the marginal risk premium
(MRP) and measures the impacts of uncertainty and risk preferences on production 
decisions.
The first-order condition in (2) shows that a farmer reaches an optimum when the 
MRP equals the wedge between the expected value of the marginal product and the input 
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price. Under risk neutrality, the first-order condition simply consists of equating the 
expected value of the marginal product to the input price 0W
x
§ w · ¨ w© ¹
¸ . While the left-hand
side of the first-order condition captures the impacts of a change in relative prices on
input use, the right-hand side measures the risk effects of policy changes. We attempt to 
empirically quantify the magnitude of both effects. To our knowledge, no previous 
analysis has assessed the overall risk-related effects of US agricultural policies.
We assume the following flexible utility function ( , )U W WT JV V   (Saha,
1997), which allows measuring a producer’s risk preferences by the following expression 
1 1T JJ V
T
  R W , where 0T !  and J  are parameters. If farmers are risk averse (neutral)
[loving], 0( )[ ]J !   . Under the assumption of risk aversion, decreasing absolute risk 
aversion (DARA), constant relative risk aversion (CARA), and increasing absolute risk
aversion (IARA) are represented by 1T ! , 1T  , and 1T  , respectively. Decreasing
relative risk aversion (DRRA), constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and increasing 
relative risk aversion (IRRA) involve T J! , T J , and T J , respectively.5
5 As an anonymous referee notes, although Saha’s (1997) utility function is flexible with respect to DARA,
CARA, versus IARA and DRRA, CRRA, versus IRRA, it should be acknowledged that it also admits
forms representing expected utility that cannot be derived from any underlying utility function.
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Comparative Statics Analysis 
Farmers are assumed to have two income sources: lump sum transfers and market
revenue. We choose market prices to represent a form of coupled income support, and
compare their production effects with production responses originated by decoupled 
payments. We assume throughout the comparative statics analysis that farmers have 
DARA ( 1T ! ) and that the marginal productivity of the variable input is positive
( ). The elasticity of agricultural output with respect to decoupled transfers is given
by
0xf !
_ _
1 0Wy G y x R G
R
A x x
VH H Hw _ !w
, (3) 
where  is the second order condition of the optimization problem,0A _ (1 )R G
G
W
H T 
is the marginal utility ratio elasticity with respect to G , which shows the risk preference 
adjustment to a change in decoupled transfers, and _y xH  is the input elasticity of output. 
In accordance with previous literature (see Hennessy, 1998; or Leathers and 
Quiggin, 1991), expression (3) suggests that an increase in decoupled government
transfers increases DARA farmers’ willingness to assume more risk, which in turn 
stimulates production  _ 0y GH ! . From equation (3) it is also clear that, since decoupled 
government transfers do not alter relative prices, they do not have an impact on a farm’s
marginal income, thus causing only a risk effect. 
The elasticity of agricultural output with respect to the output price can be 
measured as follows 
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_ _
( ) W W W
y p y x
W
p f x R R
Ax x p x x p
V V VH H
V
ª º§ ·w w ww w   « »¨¨
w w w w w
¸¸
« »© ¹¬ ¼
, (4) 
where
2
2(1 ) ( 1)
y
W
R yR p
p W
V
T J
V
§ ·w ¨   
¨w © ¹
¸
¸
 measures the impact of a price change on farmers’
risk preferences. Expression (4) shows that output price variation generates two changes
that can impact the level of output. The first is the relative price effect, which is measured
through the marginal income effect ( ) 0w§ !¨ w© ¹
f x
x
·
¸  and corresponds to the first summand in 
(4). The risk effect corresponds to the second summand and measures the impacts of 
price changes on risk and risk preferences. Specifically, WR
p x
Vww
w w
 represents the risk
aversion effect of price and captures the responses of a farmer’s risk preferences to price
changes. The sign of this effect depends upon the sign of w
w
R
p
 which cannot be anticipated 
by theory and thus must be empirically determined. Expression 0W W
W
R
x p
V V
V
w w
!
w w
 is the 
risk effect of price and measures the impact of a price change on the risk faced by the 
farmer.
Our comparative statics analysis allows derivation of expressions (3) and (4) that 
capture the effects of coupled and decoupled policy instruments on the level of 
production. A comparison of these two expressions, however, does not allow a clear 
conclusion regarding their relative magnitudes. This is an issue requiring empirical
determination. However, output price is likely to have a stronger impact on production
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relative to decoupled payments. This is because lump sum transfers only impact 
producers’ behavior through a risk effect whereas output price influences production by
means of the relative price and risk effects. However, it is unclear whether the risk-
related effects of the change in price will be bigger or smaller than the risk effects of
decoupled payments.
While price influences both risk and risk attitudes, lump sum transfers only 
impact risk attitudes. Hence, if a decline in the output price occurs, a farm’s expected
wealth will be smaller, which is likely to increase the degree of risk aversion and 
stimulate a reduction in output levels. However, this effect may be constrained by the fact
that a reduction in price will also cause a decline in a farm’s variance of wealth.
Nevertheless, to the extent that cash receipts are larger than decoupled transfers, output 
prices may have stronger effects on wealth and thus on risk preferences than is the case 
for decoupled transfers.
In order to determine the extra value that government policies add to the farm
business, we compute a farm’s certainty equivalent (CE) at different levels of 
governmental support. By using the elasticities previously determined, we assess the 
sensitivity of a farm’s CE to governmental direct payments and price-supports.
Specifically, this measure is computed for different levels of decoupled transfers and 
price-supports. This analysis can also be used to predict the impacts of government 
programs on the extensive margin of production, since a negative value of the CE 
indicates that the farmer would be better off by abandoning the activity. As a result, we 
estimate the number of farms that are likely to stop production under different support
levels. A reduction in both price supports and subsidies will reduce a farm’s profit, but 
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will also increase a farmer’s degree of risk aversion. Both changes are likely to trigger a
decline in farmers’ CE.
Empirical Specification
In order to estimate our model, we provide a parametric representation.
Generalizing the model outlined above, we allow for a multi-input production technology 
( )f x , where  is a vector of n inputs.x 6 The technology structure is approximated
through a quadratic production function 0 1 1 1
n n n
i i ij i ji i j
y xD D D
   
   x x¦ ¦ ¦  with D ’s
being parameters. Following expression (2) a system of n first-order conditions can be 
derived as 
   
2
1 1( ) 0, =1,...,pi W
i i W
ffp w W f i n
x x
T J VJ V
T V
  § ·ww    ¨ ¸¨ ¸w w© ¹
xx x  (5) 
Parameters of the production function are estimated by ordinary least squares. Parameters
that represent producers’ risk attitudes are derived through the estimation of the system of
equations (5) by non-linear three-stage least squares, conditional on the parameters 
obtained in the first step.
A two-stage estimation approach such as the one followed in this analysis will 
usually lead to inaccurate estimates of the parameters’ standard errors. We address this
problem by using bootstrapping methods. Specifically, we draw 500 pseudo-samples with 
replacement and re-estimate the model for each one, thus generating a sample of 
6 See the empirical application section for a definition of the inputs considered.
12
AC
C
EP
TE
D
M
AN
U
SC
R
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
parameter estimates. Bootstrapping allows to derive estimates that are both efficient and 
robust to heteroskedasticity. Parameter estimates and their variance-covariance matrix are 
derived from the distribution of the replicated estimates (i.e., estimates are given by the 
means and variances of the replicated sample). The elasticities of output with respect to 
coupled and decoupled policies are constructed based on the generalization of 
expressions (3) and (4) to a n-input model7 and are computed from the replicated
estimates generated in the bootstrap.
In this section we have shown that, though the sign of the effects of decoupled 
government programs can, to a certain extent, be predicted by theory, the sign of the 
impacts of a price change and the magnitude of both payment and price effects need to be 
determined by empirical analysis. We devote the next two sections to studying the 
impacts of decoupling on production decisions in a sample of Kansas farms.
Empirical Application
US farm policy underwent substantial changes in 1996. These changes involved a 
decoupling of certain aspects of US farm policy in that income-support payments were
untied from production. Loan rates are used in US agricultural policy to determine 
marketing loans and loan deficiency payments which provide income-support to farmers. 
Subsequent to the 1996 legislation, producers could take the difference between the loan 
rate and the market price (if the price were beneath the loan rate) as a direct payment
form of a price support, known as a “loan deficiency payment” or LDP. Thus, the loan 
rate served as a support price.
7 Details of this generalization are available from the authors upon request.
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The marketing loan program has long been providing agricultural price support by 
removing crops from the market when prices are below the loan rate, or below the loan
rate plus the interest charged on the loan. While the 1996 Farm Bill continued marketing
loans, it introduced important changes in the program that reduced its potential influence
on market prices. The 1996 Act eliminated base acreage requirements to be eligible for 
price supports and instituted fully decoupled payments that were intended to compensate
growers as policies were transitioned to a greater market orientation.8
Our empirical analysis focuses on a sample of Kansas farmers. Farm-level data 
were taken from farm account records from the Kansas Farm Management Association 
database for the period 1998-2001.9 Thus, our period of analysis corresponds to a time
during which the 1996 FAIR Act was effective. FAIR Act payments, also known as 
“Agricultural Market Transition Act” or AMTA payments, correspond to our definition 
of fixed payments per farm. Though the analysis is based on individual farm data,
aggregate data are needed to define several important variables not recorded in the 
Kansas dataset. These aggregates are taken from the National Agricultural Statistics
Service (NASS), the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the 
Commodity Research Bureau (CRB) historical Commodity database. NASS provides 
country-level price indices and state-level output prices and quantities. USDA data 
include state-level marketing assistance loan rates (LR) and PFC payment rates. From the 
CRB database we extracted information on agricultural commodity futures prices. 
8 To receive PFC payments, farmers who had participated in the wheat, feed grains, rice, and upland cotton
programs in any of the years of the period 1991-95, had to enter a 7-year PFC program (1996-2002).
9 Retrospective data for these farms are used to define several lagged variables used in the analysis. To be
able to do so, a complete, balanced panel is built from our sample.
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Summary statistics for the variables of interest are presented in table 1. Four 
variable inputs are considered; 1x  is chemical inputs, 2x  is fertilizers, 3x  is seed use, and
4x  is a composite input that includes energy (irrigation energy, gas and fuel-oil and
electricity). Because input prices are not identified in the Kansas database, country-level
input price indices are taken from NASS. Implicit quantity indices for variable inputs are 
derived through the ratio of input use in currency units to the corresponding price index. 
Following the theoretical model, a single output category is considered as a quantity
index that includes production of wheat, corn, grain sorghum and soybeans- the 
predominant crops in Kansas.10
An aggregate output price index is defined as a Paasche index that represents a 
farmer’s expected price. To build the expected price index, unit prices for the crops are 
defined as expected prices in the following way:  max ,p E Cp LRª º ¬ ¼ , where , the 
expected cash price, is computed as the futures price adjusted by the basis.
 CpE
11 The basis is 
calculated as the five preceding years’ average of the difference between the cash price
and the futures price. The cash price is the state-level output price. The futures price is 
defined as the daily average price during the planting season for the harvest month 
10  Our database does not provide information on input allocation among different outputs and thus a single
aggregate output is defined. In a recent paper, Davis, Lin and Shumway (2000) extend the generalised
composite commodity theorem and provide support for consistent aggregation of US agricultural outputs
into as few as two categories: crops and livestock. However the composite commodity theorem ignores risk
aversion and thus may entail problems in a framework that allows for risk and risk preferences.
11 When the futures price is unavailable, the lagged cash price is taken as the proxy for the expected price,
thus assuming naïve expectations. This only occurs for the sorghum futures price. Chicago Board of Trade
futures prices were used for wheat, corn and soybeans.
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contract. State-level production is employed to derive the aggregate expected Paasche 
index.
The Kansas database does not register PFC government payments. Instead, a 
single measure including all government payments received by each farm is recorded. To 
derive an estimate of farm-level PFC payments, the acreage of the program crops (base 
acreage) and the base yield for each crop are approximated using farm-level data. The 
approximation uses the 1986-88 average acreage and yield for each program crop and 
farm. PFC payments per crop are derived by multiplying 0.85 by the base acreage, yield
and the PFC payment rate.12 PFC payments per crop are then added to get total direct 
payments per farm.13 A farm’s initial wealth is defined as the farm’s net worth. 
Results
Our article studies farmers’ behavior under risk and uncertainty. The analysis is 
based on the expected utility model and explicitly models government farm programs.
Results of the estimation of technology and risk preference parameters are presented in 
tables 2 and 3, respectively. Parameter estimates for the production function have the 
expected signs and linear and quadratic terms are, with one exception, statistically
significant. At the data means,  and 0
ix
f ! 0
i ix x
f   which implies that an increase in 
input “i” use will increase output at a decreasing rate. Production technology for the 
12 Base acreage for most crops was established in the 1980s and thus we use actual acreage during this
period to measure a farm’s base acreage.
13 This estimate is compared to actual government payments received by each farm. If estimated PFC
payments exceed actual payments, the first measure is replaced by the second. This happens to 7% of our
observations.
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farms in our sample is characterized by decreasing returns to scale. The mean and 
standard deviation of the scale elasticity take the value of 0.98 and 0.016, respectively.
Parameter estimates for the risk preferences function are all statistically
significant and, as expected, provide evidence that farms in our sample exhibit DARA 
and IRRA preferences. The Wald test indicates the model is globally significant (see 
table 3). The estimated risk preference parameters are close to those derived by Isik and 
Khanna (2003) for a sample of Illinois farmers and by Saha (1997) for Kansas wheat
farmers. Bar-Shira et al. (1997) also found evidence of DARA and IRRA risk preferences 
for a sample of Israeli farmers. Hence, the expected utility approach yields results that are 
reasonable and compatible with previous research. Similarities between our risk
preference parameters and the ones derived by previous analyses should also allow one to 
use our results to predict farmers’ behavior in other circumstances.
Price and payment elasticities of agricultural output are offered in table 4. 
Focusing first on the total effect, coupled instruments have a much stronger impact on
production than decoupled public transfers, as expected. While the output price elasticity 
is 1.64, the decoupled payment elasticity is 0.00043, thus suggesting that very large 
decoupled payments would be required to generate perceptible production effects. This 
conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the payment elasticity is not statistically different
from zero and is compatible with Hennessy’s (1998) findings that, under DARA 
preferences, an increase in decoupled payments will have only a minor effect on 
production. From these results we can conclude that a policy reform involving a 
reduction in price supports compensated by an increase in lump-sum payments is very 
likely to have the effect of reducing agricultural output.
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Focusing on the decomposition of the total output effect of price into a relative
price effect and a risk effect, the first effect is found to dominate the second. In a risk 
neutral scenario, an increase in output prices by 1 percent would generate an increase in
output on the order of 1.45 percent. The difference between the relative price effect and 
the total effect is 0.19 which represents the risk effect of a price change. The risk effect of 
prices dominates the risk effect of payments (0.19 versus 0.00043). Again, this result is 
not surprising. For our sample farms and for the crops, decoupled payments represent less 
than 10% of total cash receipts. Hence, a change in output prices is likely to have a
substantially stronger impact on wealth than a change in PFC payments, which reinforces 
the risk effect of price.
We evaluate the impacts of government programs on farmers’ CE by computing 
this magnitude for different levels of public support and on a per acre basis. In figures 1 
and 3 we represent mean CE and their 95% confidence intervals (CI). Figures 2 and 4 are 
the result of counting the number of farms that obtain a negative CE for different levels 
of support. According to USDA baseline policy variables (see USDA 2000), marketing
assistance loan rates for the crops considered were reduced by about 6.3 per cent over the
period of analysis. We assume that any cut in marketing assistance loan rates will 
correspond to an equivalent decrease in market output prices and consider three possible
scenarios involving a 5, 10 and 15% decline in loan rates, which in turn involves a 
reduction in output prices of the same magnitudes. We analyze CE levels for a wide array
of PFC cuts, from 10 to 100%.
Results confirm our findings at the intensive margin of production, i.e., that PFC 
payments have a negligible impact on farmers’ production decisions, while the influence 
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of price supports is potentially very powerful. If PFC payments were cut by half (figure
1), average CE could suffer a decline on the order of 10%. In spite of this decline in the 
CE, only 0.1% of the farms would be better off by abandoning their activity (figure 2).
The elimination of PFC payments would reduce the mean CE by almost 20%, causing
0.22% of the farms to have a negative CE.
Conversely, if one assumes a reduction in market prices, the results are 
substantially different. A reduction in output prices on the order of 10% implies a 62% 
decline in the CE and triggers the abandonment of almost 9% of the sample farms. A 
15% cut in market prices would reduce the CE by 86% and would motivate the 
abandonment of almost 45% of the farms. Finally, a 5% decline in prices has an impact at
the extensive margin that is equivalent to the elimination of decoupled transfers, i.e., it 
causes abandonment of 0.2% of the farms.
Concluding remarks 
This article develops a model of production under uncertainty based on the Isik 
and Khanna (2003) framework and evaluates the effects of the FAIR Act policy changes
both at the intensive and extensive margins. Though the theoretical framework allows 
prediction of the sign of the effects of decoupled government transfers, the impacts of a
price change cannot be predicted by theory. Additionally, the theoretical framework does 
not allow drawing a conclusion regarding the relative magnitudes of the price and
payment effects. Farm-level data for a sample of Kansas farms are used to estimate the 
model.
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Results show that farmers in the sample have risk preferences that are 
characterized by decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) and increasingly relative risk
aversion (IRRA). The expected utility framework leads to reasonable results that are 
comparable with previous research. Similarities between our risk preference parameters
and the ones derived by previous analyses suggest that our results could be used to 
predict farmers’ behavior in other circumstances.
Though decoupled government transfers are found to motivate an increase in 
input use and thus in agricultural output, elasticity values are very small, requiring 
substantial changes in payments to generate perceptible effects on production.
Conversely, the effects of coupled policies such as price-supports are found to be 
substantially higher. Hence, a decoupling process consisting of a reduction in price 
supports in favor of decoupled government transfers is very likely to involve a reduction 
in output. The risk effect of a price change is found to dominate the risk effect of
payments, a result which is not surprising in light of the magnitude of crop cash receipts 
relative to decoupled transfers.
The impact of lump sum payments on farmers’ CE is found to be negligible. An
elimination of PFC payments may reduce the mean CE by almost 20%, but would result 
in only 0.22% abandonment. In comparison, a 15% price decline would cause almost
45% of the farms to have a negative CE. Hence, though PFC payments are not fully 
decoupled in the presence of risk and uncertainty, their effects on agricultural production 
seem to be of a very small magnitude.
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Table 1. Summary statistics for the variables of interest 
Variable
n= 2,241 
Mean Standard deviation
y  (output) 146,910.66 123,608.74
p  (expected price) 0.92 0.06
1x  (chemical input) 15,022.37 17,390.11
1w  ( 1x  price) 0.99 0.01
2x  (fertilizer) 19,798.01 21,076.48
2w  ( 2x  price) 1.01 0.06
3x  (seed) 13,861.41 16,678.80
3w  ( 3x  price) 1.02 0.03
4x  (energy) 15,028.54 16,471.51
4w  ( 4x  price) 1.01 0.03
G  (PFC payments) 12,014.92 9,233.03
Z  (initial wealth) 669,663.10 587,319.18
Note: all monetary values are expressed in constant 1998 currency units
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Table 2. Parameter estimates and summary statistics for the production function 
Parameter Coefficient
estimate
Standard error
0D -1,688.82 3,512.69
1D 3.45** 0.37
2D 2.23** 0.28
3D 2.15** 0.46
4D 2.44** 0.38
11D
(1) -1.79** 0.62
22D -0.45* 0.27
33D -0.14 1.02
44D -2.18** 0.71
12D -0.94 0.79
13D 0.50 1.36
14D 0.66 1.41
23D 0.48 11.60
24D 1.72 1.08
34D 0.11 1.64
Note: An asterisk (*) denotes statistical significance at the Į = 0.1 level
Two asterisks (**) denote statistical significance at the Į = 0.05 level
(1) All cross terms were scaled by 1/100,000
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Table 3. Parameter estimates and summary statistics for the risk preferences 
function
Parameter Coefficient
estimate
Standard error
J 1.26** 0.03
T 1.02** 0.01
Wald test for global
significance
0 : 0i ii ijH D D D J T     
23,647.00**
Note: An asterisk (*) denotes statistical significance at the Į = 0.1 level
Two asterisks (**) denote statistical significance at the Į = 0.05 level
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Table 4. Elasticity estimates at the data means
Elasticity value Standard error 
Total Effect
_y p
H
1.64* 0.88
_y G
H
4.43E-4 6.66E-4
Risk Effect
_y p
H
0.19* 0.10
_y G
H
4.43E-4 6.66E-4
Relative price effect
_y p
H
1.45* 0.88
_y G
H
- -
Note: An asterisk (*) denotes statistical significance at the Į = 0.1 level
Government payments have no relative price effect, which is denoted by ‘-’
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Figure 1. Farm’s certainty equivalent for different levels of PFC payments
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Figure 2. Percentage of farms that will obtain a negative certainty equivalent if PFC 
payments are reduced
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Figure 3. Farm’s certainty equivalent for different levels of price supports
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Figure 4. Percentage of farms that will obtain a negative certainty equivalent if price
supports are reduced 
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